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Abstract
While the failure of the so-called classical theory of concepts—according to 
which definitions are the proper way to characterize concepts—is a consen-
sus, metaphysical philosophy of religion still deals with the concept of God 
in a predominantly definitional way. It thus seems fair to ask: Does this fail-
ure imply that a definitional characterization of the concept of God is equally 
untenable? The first purpose of this paper is to answer this question. I focus 
on the representational side of the matter. My goal is to analyze the extent to 
which the most important problems raised against the classical view of con-
cepts affect a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God. 
The second purpose of the paper is to deepen into these issues, arguing for a 
pluralistic view of concepts and outlining a hybrid special theory of concepts, 
called the theory of ideal concepts. The theory is special because it deals with 
a special sort of concepts that I call ideal concepts; it is hybrid because, in 
addition to definitions, it uses another structure in the characterization of con-
cepts: ideals. My goal is to argue that when applied to the concept of God and 
added to a pluralistic view of concepts, this theory can function as a tenable 
representational theory of the concept of God.
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The debate on the rationality of theism inside metaphysical philosophy of religion 
has taken place mainly on two fronts: the construction and analysis of arguments 
for and against the existence of GOD and the analysis of the concept of God.1 It is 
a truism that both concern with the concept of God; it is also a truism that they pre-
suppose proper ways to represent such concept. What is not a truism is the apparent 
negligence of metaphysical philosophers of religion with regards to the study of the-
ories of concepts undertaken in philosophy and psychology in the past five decades.
Usually, a theory of concepts addresses psychological issues such as how concepts are 
acquired and used by people to categorize objects and make inferences, as well as philo-
sophical issues such as the ontological status of concepts. From a general viewpoint, it 
aims at saying what a concept is; or in other words, filling in the X in the schema below:
(T) Concepts are X.
Many kinds of structures have been proposed to play the role of X: definitions, pro-
totypes, sets of exemplars, theory-like structures of some sort, perceptual ‘proxytypes’, 
etc. (Murphy, 2002) (Margolis & Laurence, 2019). Regardless of the chosen structure, 
by saying what a concept is, a theory of concepts also says how concepts are to be 
characterized or represented. It therefore also fills in the X in the schema below:
(R) Concepts are to be represented as X.
Although theories of concepts usually aim at (T), they can be also thought as 
aiming at (R). When this is the case, I say the theory is a representational theory of 
concepts, or an R-theory of concepts for short; if it aims at (T), I call it is a T-theory 
of concepts. (T) and (R) can also be thought in terms of individual concepts. For 
example, applied to the concept of God, (T) and (R) would be as follows:
(TG) The concept of God is X.
(RG) The concept of God is to be represented as X.
If a theory of concepts does not aim at (T) or (R), but at special versions of it, 
then I say it is a special theory of concepts (as opposed to a general theory of con-
cepts). A theory focused on  (RG) would be a special R-theory of concepts, or an 
R-theory of the concept of God. Most, if not all, theories of concepts are general 
T-theories of concepts.
The received view in philosophy on how to represent concepts seems to be 
what is now called the classical theory of concepts. Rooted in ideas of philoso-
phers like Plato, Aristotle and Locke,2 the classical theory takes definitions as 
2 Locke seems to assume something very close to the classical theory when he gives an account of the 
concept of sun, for example: “[T]he Idea of the Sun, what is it, but an aggregate of those several simple 
Ideas, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and, per-
haps, some other” (Locke, 1690/1975, pp. 298–299). Plato’s use of what might be seen as the basic tenets 
of the classical theory can be found in the Euthyphro and Aristotle’s in the Categories.
1 Some people will add a third one: the issue of rational doxastic warrant.
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the appropriate way to characterize concepts. According to this view, the concept 
of bachelor would be characterized through a list of necessary and conjointly 
sufficient property conditions: a bachelor is an (1) unmarried (2) male (3) adult 
(4) human being. If an entity a possesses all properties, then it falls under the 
concept of bachelor (the conditions are sufficient); and for a to be a bachelor, it 
must possess all properties (the conditions are necessary). The X in (T) and (R) 
would thus be something like this: definitions based on lists of property condi-
tions; an object falls under the concept if and only if it possesses all properties of 
the list.
The construction and analysis of theistic and atheistic arguments and the analy-
sis of the concept of God rely on something very close to the classical theory of 
concepts. The analysis of the concept of God, for example, centers around prop-
erties (usually called divine attributes, or divine properties) such as omniscience, 
omnipotence, wholly goodness, eternity, simplicity, incorporeality, etc. Although 
there have been attempts to present the concept of God in such a way that these 
properties follow from a general definition—such as Anselm’s definition of God as 
that than which nothing greater can be thought—or from a sole property—such as 
Richard Swinburne’s (2016, p. 173) attempt to derive all properties from the prop-
erty of omnipotence—, the concept of God is mostly characterized through a list of 
properties that GOD (the entity that falls under the concept of God3) is supposed 
to possess.4 For example, in the sections devoted to the concept of God, textbooks 
and companions on the philosophy of religion tend to deal almost exclusively with 
these divine properties.5 The same happens with arguments for and against the exist-
ence of GOD. Arguments from evil, for example, need God to be characterized as a 
being who possesses (at least) these three properties: omniscience, omnipotence and 
wholly goodness.
Since the 1950’s, and especially from 1970 onward, the classical theory has been 
under strong attack. Most scholars today believe that the many problems raised 
against the classical view of concepts undermine its tenability (Rosch, 1978) (Smith 
& Medin, 1981, p. 26–51) (Laurence & Margolis, 1999, p. 8–27) (Murphy, 2002, 
p. 11–24). But if classical theory seems to be so ingrained in contemporary philo-
sophical inquiry on God, we can ask: To what extent do these problems affect the 
representation of the concept of God? Are they enough to undermine the project 
of definitionally characterizing the concept of God? And what other problems this 
project faces as a result?
3 In order to distinguish between the concept of God and the (possible) instance of this concept, I will 
refer to the latter using capital letters. Thus, while “God” means the concept of God, “GOD” means the 
entity which supposedly falls under the concept of God (although most of the time I will use the complex 
expression “concept of God”).
4 The properties we choose and the way we interpret them give rise to different views on GOD. Exam-
ples of this are classical theism, open theism, process theism and deism (which denies that GOD has the 
property of being known through divine revelation).
5 Here are some examples: Chapter 1 of (Rowe, 1993), Part I of (Mann, 2005), Part I of (Mawson, 2005) 
and Part IV of (Taliaferro et al., 2010).
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The first purpose of this paper is to answer these questions. I focus on the rep-
resentational side of the matter. My goal is to analyze the extent to which the most 
important problems raised against the classical view of concepts affect a defini-
tional-representational approach to the concept of God. Otherwise said, I want to 
see if the classical theory can function as a special R-theory applied to the concept 
of God.6 As a result of this effort, I show that the criticisms against the classical the-
ory that do threaten a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God 
depend on the plurality characteristic of interreligious context, which by itself cre-
ates further problems.
The second purpose of the paper is to deepen these issues, arguing for a plural-
istic view of concepts and outlining a hybrid special theory of concepts, called the 
theory of ideal concepts. The theory is special because it deals with a special kind 
of concepts that I call ideal concepts; it is hybrid because, in addition to definitions, 
it uses another structure in the characterization of X in (T) and (R): ideals. My goal 
is to argue that when aimed at  (RG) and added to a pluralistic view of concepts, this 
theory can function as a tenable R-theory of the concept of God.
My focus here is on the monotheistic concept of God. When I write “concept of 
God” (or simply “God”) I really mean the monotheistic concept of God. The reason 
for that is very simple. This is the kind of concept that is at the center of the philo-
sophical debate on the rationality of theism. When contemporary philosophers argue 
for and against the existence of God, or for and against the coherence of the concept 
of God, they generally assume a monotheistic approach. However, and despite this, I 
will at end of the paper show how this idealistic R-theory of the concept of God can 
be extended so as to encompasses polytheistic accounts as well.
2  Empirical problems and God as an abstract concept
The classical theory of concepts supposes a procedure for unambiguously deter-
mining category membership (through a list of conjointly sufficient property condi-
tions). But many concepts appear to be fuzzy or inexact, so that membership deter-
mination is not clear. Carpets are furniture? Is olive a fruit? Is Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely 
Hearts Club Band a work of art? The fact that many people seem unsure about how 
to answer these questions or answer them differently at different times seems to be a 
problem for the aforementioned membership determination procedure.
It also seems to be a problem that people might possess a concept despite 
being mistaken or ignorant about its defining properties. For example, people 
used to believe that diseases like smallpox were the effects of evil spirits or divine 
retribution; they were also ignorant about many properties that we today attribute 
to smallpox, such as that it spreads through person-to-person contact and saliva 
droplets in an infected person’s breath. The fact that people might possess a con-
cept despite failing to assign a property which is on the list, or despite assigning 
6 Although many aspects of my analysis might also apply to this special theory (the classical theory 
applied to the concept of God) seen as a T-theory.
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one that cannot be on the list, seems to show that the classical theory is at odds 
with concept possession.
These two problems, called respectively the problem of conceptual fuzzi-
ness and the problem of error and ignorance, belong to what might be called 
the empirical problems of the classical theory. They have to do with observable 
human psychological reality. For a theory of concepts to be empirically adequate, 
it must explain, or at least be compatible with, observable facts about how people 
acquire and use concepts.
Perhaps the most famous empirical problem is the problem of typicality effects. 
Experimentation has shown that people consider some exemplars of a category 
to be more typical or usual than others; trout and sharks are thought to be more 
typical fish than eels and flounders; robins are more typical birds than chickens 
and vultures. It has also been shown that when categorization speed and error are 
at issue, typicality does play a crucial role (Rosch, 1978) (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
But according to the classical theory, all instances of a concept are on equal foot-
ing: if all that is needed for an object to fall under the concept of bird is to satisfy 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, then all (and only) birds should do 
this equally. The classical view cannot distinguish between typical and atypical 
members of a category.
One might think that these problems can be dismissed by pointing out that a 
philosophical approach to concepts should not be concerned with observable human 
psychological reality. What does the way people categorize objects, for example, has 
to do with philosophizing about concepts? Well, if the goal of such approach is the 
proper representation of concepts, that is to say, if it is an R-theory of concepts, then 
it does not seem absurd to require that it takes seriously into consideration the way 
people use concepts.
Anyway, assuming for the sake of the discussion that these empirical issues do 
matter for an R-theory of concepts, we might ask: do they matter for an R-theory 
of the concept of God? To answer this question, we must go through a couple of 
peculiarities about the concept of God itself. First, like the concepts of prime num-
ber, ideal gas and perfect circle, the concept of God is an abstract concept. This can 
be understood in at least two different ways. Like the concept of prime number, the 
concept of God is abstract in the following sense: an entity that falls under it cannot 
be concrete, in the sense of having a spatiotemporal location. If GOD exists, like the 
prime numbers 7 and 13, it is not in the realm of concrete entities.
But the concept of God is also abstract in another sense. Like the concepts 
of ideal gas and perfect circle, the concept of God is an idealization in the sense 
of a view too perfect or excellent of things we find in the world; so perfect that 
it cannot exist in the world. Even if God as a whole cannot be seen in this ideal-
ized, maximally perfect way, some aspects of it certainly can. Most divine proper-
ties, for example, can be seen as idealizations in this sense. Omnipotence, omnisci-
ence, wholly goodness, eternity and simplicity can all be seen as maximally perfect 
views of properties we find in the world. Because of that, there cannot be concrete 
entities that instantiate them. It is this abstraction based on an idealization in the 
sense of maximal perfection that I have in mind when I say that the concept of God 
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is abstract. I call it idealization-maximal-perfection (IMP) abstractedness; God, I 
claim, is an IMP abstract concept or ideal concept, for short.7
The kind of possibility present in the claim that there cannot be concrete instances 
of abstract concepts depends on the concept at stake. For example, in the case of the 
concept of prime number, we might say that it is metaphysically impossible that 
there exist concrete instances of it in the world. But the fact that there cannot be an 
ideal gas in the world seems to follow from the laws of nature that operate in our 
world; it is a kind of physical possibility. This is in fact a consequence of the IMP 
abstractedness of the concept of ideal gas. Since it maximally perfects something we 
find in the physical world, it goes beyond physical possibility. As far as the concept 
of God is concerned, it is certainly not absurd to follow the first path and say that 
it is metaphysically impossible that there exists a concrete instance of it. However, 
since I am favoring this IMP abstractedness, it is enough for me to understand the 
claim that there cannot be a concrete instance of the concept of God in the weaker 
sense of physical possibility.8
A further remark about abstractedness is order here. I have so far applied to word 
“abstract” to concepts, arguing that God is an abstract concept. But we know that the 
word is also applied to objects. Sets, propositions, the number 2 and Dante’s Inferno 
are traditionally seen as abstract objects. Given what I said above, the connection 
between abstract concepts and abstract objects seems obvious: If an object x falls 
under an abstract concept, then x is abstract. This is not the path I will follow here.
First because the connection I have made above between abstract concepts and 
the objects that fall under them was in terms of non-concreteness, not abstracted-
ness: I argued that that there cannot be concrete instances of abstract concepts. Sec-
ond because I will follow what David Lewis (1986, p. 83) calls the negative path and 
take abstract objects simply as objects that are causally ineffective.9 (As I have said, 
9 Although abstract objects is a controversial topic, this is a view accepted by many contemporary phi-
losophers. For space reasons, I will not be able to elaborate here on its pros and cons. For that, as well as 
for alternative views, see (Rosen, 2020).
7 It is important to notice that this claim does not exclude views such as open theism and process the-
ism, nor is it an application or reaffirmation of the basic principle of perfect being theology. It is perhaps 
true that open theism and process theism do not take on the properties of omniscience and omnipotence, 
respectively, in a maximal way. Nevertheless, at least one other divine attribute is seen in this idealized, 
maximally perfect way by these views. And that is all the claim entails: that some aspect of the concept 
of God can be seen in a maximally perfect way; other aspects might be seen differently. It is also impor-
tant to notice that the claim that concept c is IMP abstract does not imply that an object C that falls under 
it is an ultimate reality and therefore something that deserves our unconditional concern (although at 
least one IMP abstract concept, namely the monotheistic concept of God, is generally seen this way).
8 From this one might conclude that pantheism does not fit this account of God. Even though it fits in the 
sense that even the pantheistic concept of God might be seen as an IMP abstraction - after all, in panthe-
ism GOD is identified with the cosmos, so that the maximal aspect is certainly there; some pantheists, 
such as Zeno of Citium, for example, have defended that nothing is better than the cosmos, incorporating 
then some type of perfect being theology - one might claim that pantheism clearly sees GOD as concrete. 
That is not necessarily the case. If we understand the cosmos as the whole (ordered) universe, then the 
cosmos is not concrete in the sense of having a spatiotemporal location, since time and space are part of 
the cosmos. That is one way to account for pantheism. This should not be seen, of course, as an endorse-
ment of pantheism as a monotheistic view. (I am obviously aware that pantheism is generally not seen as 
a monotheistic view, although it does claim that there is only one GOD.) Rather, it should be simply seen 
as an (extra) indication of the comprehensiveness of my approach.
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concrete objects are objects that have a spatiotemporal location, which necessar-
ily involves causal effectiveness.) Since a non-abstract object is one that is causally 
effective, non-abstractedness and concreteness are not equivalent: non-abstract non-
concrete objects, that is, causally effective objects without spaciotemporal location 
are logically possible.10 This is of course needed if we want to cope with the idea 
that GOD, although non-concrete, can interact causally with the world.
A second peculiarity about God is that the number of instances of the concept 
of God is either one or zero; like the concept of actual king of France, God is an 
extensionally unique concept. If there was any instance of the concept of actual king 
of France, it would be at most one. Similarly, if there is any entity which falls under 
the concept of God, it would be at most one. This is a consequence of the kind of 
concept of God that I am focusing on here: the monotheistic concept of God; it pre-
supposes what I call the assumption of monotheism:
(AM) There is at most one entity that falls under the concept of God.
A stronger, extensional version of (AM) can be stated as follows:
(EAM) There is at most one GOD; otherwise said, the number of extensions of 
the word “GOD” is at most one.11
Getting back to the empirical problems that helped to undermine the classical 
theory of concepts, at first glance they do not seem to threaten a definitional-rep-
resentational approach to the concept of God. First, since we are dealing with an 
abstract concept that cannot have concrete instances, category membership determi-
nation issues such as the ones involved in the problems of conceptual fuzziness and 
typicality effects do not appear. Unless the candidates for members of a category are 
observable, which presuppose that they have a spatiotemporal location, there is no 
10 Commenting on this view of abstract objects, Gideon Rosen (2020) writes as follows: “It is widely 
maintained that causation, strictly speaking, is a relation among events or states of affairs. If we say that 
the rock—an object—caused the window to break, what we mean is that some event or state (or fact or 
condition) involving the rock caused the break. If the rock itself is a cause, it is a cause in some deriva-
tive sense. But this derivative sense has proved elusive. The rock’s hitting the window is an event in 
which the rock ‘participates’ in a certain way, and it is because the rock participates in events in this 
way that we credit the rock itself with causal efficacy. But what is it for an object to participate in an 
event? Suppose John is thinking about the Pythagorean Theorem and you ask him to say what’s on his 
mind. His response is an event—the utterance of a sentence; and one of its causes is the event of John’s 
thinking about the theorem. Does the Pythagorean Theorem ‘participate’ in this event? There is surely 
some sense in which it does. The event consists in John’s coming to stand in a certain relation to the 
theorem, just as the rock’s hitting the window consists in the rock’s coming to stand in a certain relation 
to the glass. But we do not credit the Pythagorean Theorem with causal efficacy simply because it par-
ticipates in this sense in an event which is a cause. The challenge is therefore to characterize the distinc-
tive manner of ‘participation in the causal order’ that distinguishes the concrete entities. This problem 
has received relatively little attention. There is no reason to believe that it cannot be solved. But in the 
absence of a solution, this standard version of the Way of Negation must be reckoned a work in pro-
gress.”.
11 Although (EAM) entails (AM), the converse is not true. I come back to this point later.
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way people might get confused about whether something belongs or not to it or find 
some members more typical than others.
Second, the idealized aspect of the concept of God seems to make irrelevant how 
people conceive GOD. Like the concepts of ideal gas and perfect circle, the concept 
of God can be said to be the result of a process of idealization where certain things 
found in our world are conceived in a maximally perfect way. As such, its being pos-
sessed by someone seems to depend entirely on the individual assigning the proper 
properties. If people get it wrong, assigning a wrong property, or failing to assign 
a correct one, then they simply do not possess the concept of God. Therefore, the 
problem of error and ignorance does not arise either.
But things are not that simple. It seems arbitrary to claim that someone does not 
possess the concept of God simply because his/her understanding does not fit some 
idealized view of GOD. This is especially relevant when we consider the plurality of 
existing monotheistic views on GOD. Virtually every monotheistic religious tradi-
tion—and sometimes every school or order inside traditions—has its own view on 
GOD, which is shared by many of its members. It is expected that many of these 
people will err or be ignorant about whatever idealized view on GOD we have. But it 
seems odd to suppose that thousands and thousands of religious practitioners, from 
different cultures and historical periods, who have prayed to GOD, worshiped GOD 
and many times dedicated their entire lives to GOD, did not possess the concept of 
God. It thus seems that the problem of error and ignorance does not fade away.
3  In‑principle problems
The second category of problems that threatened the classical theory is what might 
be called in-principle problems12; these are problems that can be stated without 
referring to psychological empirical data. One example of in-principle problem 
is the problem of failure of transitivity. Many concepts seem to be hierarchically 
ordered in such a way that the relationship between them is transitive. Robins are 
birds, birds are vertebrates and vertebrates are animals; hence, robins are also verte-
brates and animals. The classical theory not only explains this conceptual transitiv-
ity but is bound by it: if A’s are B’s and B’s are C’s, then according to the classical 
theory A’s are C’s. The problem is that for many concepts, this transitivity seems 
not to hold. Car seats are chairs; chairs are furniture; but car seats are not furniture. 
Wooden spoons are spoons; spoons are cutlery; but wooden spoons are not cutlery.13
12 I borrowed this terminology from George Murphy, who divides his section on the problems of the 
classical theory into two subsections: “in-principle arguments” and “empirical problems” (Murphy 2002, 
p. 16–24), although my classification does not completely matches his. For a comprehensive overview of 
the main problems faced by the classical view of concepts see (Rosch, 1978), (Smith and Medin, 1981, p. 
26–51), (Laurence and Margolis, 1999, p. 8–27) and (Murphy, 2002, p. 11–24).
13 Notice that these claims should be understood in a conceptual, non-empirical context. For example, 
when I say that chairs are furniture I am not saying that all chairs are furniture, which would be false, but 
that the property of being a furniture belongs to the list of property conditions that defines the concept of 
chair (if we characterize the concept of chair according to the classical theory, of course).
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Is this a problem for an R-theory of the concept of God? It seems it is not. If our 
concern is exclusively with the concept of God, eventual relations between the con-
cept of God and other concepts might be neglected, making thus irrelevant the fact 
that some of these relations are not transitive.
A more threatening in-principle problem is the problem of lack of successful def-
initions, which has been seen by some as the most serious threat to the classical 
theory of concepts (Margolis & Laurence, 2019). This is the problem that, for most 
concepts, there seems to be no satisfactory definition. Wittgenstein has famously 
argued that the concept of game cannot be reasonably defined. Other example 
from philosophy: since Edmund Gettier first challenged the traditional definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief, there has been widespread agreement that the tra-
ditional definition is incorrect or at least incomplete. But despite the proliferation of 
proposals and enormous amount of effort that has gone into the matter, philosophers 
have not agreed on what the correct definition is; as a result, we still lack a satisfac-
tory definition of the concept of knowledge.
There are in fact very few examples in philosophy of successful definitional anal-
yses, none of which are uncontroversial (Wittgenstein, 1953/1958, Fodor, 1981). 
One might think that outside philosophy, perhaps in certain technical domains such 
as the natural sciences, concepts might be well defined. Gregory Murphy (2002, pp. 
18–19) has argued that this is not true: when one goes deep in such domains, one 
finds more and more fuzziness, rather than perfectly clear definitions.
One might reply that definitions are simply hard to come by: perhaps we are not 
clever enough to think of the defining properties of these concepts; or perhaps they 
will be found in 100 years from now. But another possibility is that our concepts 
lack that kind the structure that is required by a definition (let us call it definitional 
structure). Of course, the fact that no one has successfully defined concept C is com-
patible with both possibilities: that there is a definition out there waiting to be found 
or that C lacks definitional structure. However, it seems to be incumbent on the 
defender of the classical theory to explain our failure in finding a satisfactory defini-
tion of C, as it is incumbent on him/her to provide the definition in the first place. If 
the concepts of game, knowledge and dog are definitions, why are we so bad at say-
ing what they are? The defender of the classical theory has no answer.
If we were to characterize the problem of lack of successful definitions in 
terms of an individual concept C, we would say that it arises from a plurality 
of attempts to define C, none of which produces something close to a consen-
sus in the relevant community. In the case of the concept of knowledge, we 
have dozens of attempts to define it, none of which satisfactorily coped with 
all the criteria required by the community of epistemologists. The situation 
thus points to a failure of the classical theory to satisfactorily characterize C; 
in the most skeptical case, it points to C’s lack of definitional structure.
Is this the case with the concept of God? It seems it is. First, from a confessional 
point of view, there is a plurality of definitions with nothing even remotely close to a 
consensus amongst theists. Christian scholars define the concept of God differently 
from Jewish scholars, who define it differently from Islamic scholars, who define it 
differently from theistic Vedanta scholars, and so on and so forth. There is no agree-
ment even within traditions. For example, when dealing with the problem of the 
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Trinity, Christian scholars have proposed different and conflicting ways to define the 
Christian concept of God (Tuggy, 2006).
Second, there is plurality and disagreement also from a philosophical standpoint. 
There is a multitude of philosophical views on GOD: classical theism, process the-
ism, open theism, deism, panentheism. From the standpoint of divine properties, 
each of these views corresponds to a different definition (or category of definitions, 
to be more precise) of the concept of God. In fact, there is a multitude of definitions 
of God that can be obtained from different subsets of divine properties. Even if we 
speak on what some call minimal theism, that is, GOD as an omnipotent, omnisci-
ent and wholly good being who created the world, there is no agreement about the 
correct meaning of the pertinent terms. In fact, when we take a closer look at the 
literature, we see that the correct meaning of terms such as “omnipotence”, “omnis-
cience”, “wholly goodness” and “eternity” is still open.14 From this we can conclude 
that the classical theory of concepts is unable to satisfactorily deal with the concept 
of God, or, in the most skeptical case, that it is likely that the concept of God lacks 
definitional structure.
4  The plurality of concepts of God
Here is where we have got to so far. While a definitional-representational approach 
to the concept of God is not threatened by most of the criticisms that undermined 
the classical view of concepts, two problems remain: the problem of error and igno-
rance and the problem of lack of successful definitions.
As we have seen, for an arbitrary concept C, these problems arise in the context 
of a plurality of views about C. While the problem of error and ignorance requires 
a plurality of people who are mistaken or ignorant about the defining properties of 
C, the problem of lack of successful definitions requires a plurality of unsuccessful 
attempts to define C. Notice that this plurality must actually refer to C. In the case 
of the problem of error and ignorance, the concept that people possess must be the 
same concept C that has been definitionally characterized; in the case of the problem 
of lack of successful definitions, the proposed definitions must be attempts to define 
C, not a different but related concept.
Does the plurality of views about GOD relate to the same very concept? It depends. 
From a philosophical viewpoint, things might be ambiguous. While it does make 
sense to say that the attempts to define God by philosophers are all attempts to charac-
terize the same concept (the God of the philosophers?), the plurality of existing philo-
sophical views on GOD might be used to defend the idea that these views correspond 
to different concepts of God.
14 For an overview of the debate on the divine properties see the chapters of Part I of (Mann, 2005) 
and Part IV of (Taliaferro et al., 2010). For traditional and alternative philosophical views on God see 
(Owen, 1971), (Oppy, 2014), (Buckareff and Nagasawa, 2016) and (Dombrowski, 2017).
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The same cannot be said from a confessional viewpoint. Here things seem to be 
unambiguous. As I have said earlier in connection with the problem of error and 
ignorance, every monotheistic religious tradition—and sometimes every school 
within traditions—has its own view on GOD. And it is far from trivial that these dif-
ferent views correspond to the same concept.15 In fact, considering the sometimes-
astonishing differences between them, it is reasonable to suppose the opposite: that 
they deal with different concepts. If this is right, then we cannot say that there is the 
concept of God, at least not from the viewpoint of religious traditions. Instead, what 
do exist are different, possibly incompatible, concepts of God.16 Thus, the claim 
below seems to be true:
(PG) There is a plurality of concepts of God.
The implications of (PG) are as follows. First, the problem of lack of successful defi-
nitions seems to lose some of its fuel. If the efforts of theologians are not attempts to 
define the concept of God but a specific concept of God, then they do not belong to the 
class of unsuccessful attempts to definitionally characterize the concept of God. There-
fore, the diversity of confessional attempts to define God cannot be used to support the 
conclusion that the classical theory is unable to satisfactorily characterize the concept 
of God, nor that the concept of God lacks definitional structure.
Second, if in fact there is no unique concept of God, the problem of error and 
ignorance fades away. Theists do not err, nor are they ignorant about whatever con-
cept of God philosophers are trying to define; they genuinely possess a concept of 
God, but one which is peculiar to the tradition they belong to. The conclusion then 
is that the two remaining criticisms to the classical view do not touch the project of 
definitionally representing the concept of God.
15 I am using the expressions “view on GOD” and “concept of God” with different meanings. Although 
a view on GOD usually corresponds to some concept of God, it might be fuzzy enough to correspond to 
more than one concept of God or perhaps to no concept of God at all. Second, a view on GOD already 
presupposes the existence of some superlative being; that is why I use “GOD” instead of “God”.
16 For example, according to orthodox Christianity, GOD is a trinitarian entity. This appears very 
clearly, for example, in the Athanasian Creed. Out of its 44 theses, three of them state as follows: (1) 
“We worship GOD in Trinity and Trinity in Unity… Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the 
substance.”; (2) “So the Father is GOD, the Son is GOD, and the Holy Spirit is GOD.”; (3) “And yet they 
are not three GODS, but one GOD.” Islam, on the other hand, emphasizes that GOD is strictly singular 
(tawḥīd), unique (wāḥid) and inherently One (aḥad) (Esposito,  1998, p. 88). In its turn, the so-called 
“Hindu bible”, the Bhagavad-gītā, while stating that GOD (who is identified with the speaker of the text, 
Kṛṣṇa) is oneHe is the great Lord of all the worlds (5.29), the Supreme Divine Person (10.12), the God 
of the gods (10.14) and their origin (10.12, 11.38); no one is equal to or greater than Him (11.38),claims 
that He is identical with everything (7.19, 11.40) (Resnick, 1995, p. 7–9;13–17). One might reply that 
these brief descriptions are not conclusive about whether we have three different concepts of God. That 
is true. However, from the surface, these descriptions of God undeniably contain divergent and conflict-
ing conceptual elements. The same can be said about the descriptions of many other religious traditions. 
Moreover, it seems that the burden of proof lies with the one who maintains that these views share the 
same concept of God. Therefore, unless there is a very compelling argument against it, I maintain what 




But this solution to the problems of error and ignorance and lack of success-
ful definitions underestimate (PG). By focusing on a specific concept of God, we 
automatically disregard the way many religious traditions view GOD. Since (PG) 
does not imply any kind of hierarchy between the various existing concepts of God, 
we can ask: If there are several concepts of God, what guarantees that the one we 
choose to define is the ‘correct’ one? Unless there is a satisfactory answer to this, 
that is, unless there is a satisfactory argument against what I call the assumption of 
conceptual homogeneity:
(AH) There is a homogeneity in terms of philosophical legitimacy among all con-
cepts of God.
favoring a specific concept of God to the point of nullifying all the others, the pro-
ject of definitionally representing the concept of God seems to be doomed to failure.
5  Pluralistic view of concepts
But there is an even more fundamental issue. The classical view of concepts assumes 
what Daniel Weiskopf (2008, p. 150) calls the singularity assumption:
(SA) For any category that can be conceptually represented, there is a unique 
concept of that category.
Like most theories of concepts, the classical theory presupposes that there is such a 
thing as the unique concept of knowledge, the unique concept of game and the unique 
concept of God.17 Indeed, unless there is a unique concept of God, there is no point 
in offering a definitional characterization of the concept of God. That is why a plural-
ity of concepts of God weakens the project of definitionally representing God. This 
becomes evident when we see that the individual-conceptual version of (SA) applied 
to God contradicts (PG):
(SAG) There is a unique concept of God.
Weiskopf also mentions other assumption that, according to him, most theories of 
concepts assume. That is the uniformity assumption:
(UA) All concepts belong to a single psychological kind.
By psychological kind Weiskopf (2008, p. 145) means the kind of structure that 
plays the role of the X in (T) (his focus is on T-theories of concepts). As far as I am 
concerned, all I need is UA’s representational version, which I call the representa-
tional uniformity assumption:
17 It should be noted that Weiskopf does not refer to the classical theory in his paper.
1 3
Philosophia 
(RUA) All concepts are to be represented with the help of a single kind of struc-
ture.
There is a weaker version of (RUA):
(RUA’) For every concept C, C is to be represented with the help of a single kind 
of structure.
, as there is a version of (RUA’) applied to God:
(RUAG) The concept of God is to be represented with the help of a single kind of 
structure.
Like most theories of concepts, the classical theory presupposes (UA) and 
(RUA): seen as a T-theory, it claims that all concepts are definitions; seen as an 
R-theory it claims that all concepts are to be represented as definitions.
It seems clear that (UA) and (RUA) are essential assumptions of classical theory. 
But how about (SA)? Is it possible to reject it and remain within the classical view 
of concepts? It seems it is, at least as far as our project of definitionally represent-
ing the concept of God is concerned. There are at least two paths we could follow 
that would allow us to reject  (SAG) and consequently retain (PG): to refute (AH), 
arguing in favor of that concept of God that is the object of our definitional analysis 
to the point of nullifying all the others, or to take (PG) more seriously into account 
and definitionally represent each one of the several concepts of God. While the first 
path does not seem to be feasible, the second one does not seem to involve any big 
difficulties. We would have a definition of the Christian concept of God, a defini-
tion of the Islamic concept of God, a definition of the Jewish concept of God (or 
more realistically: several definitions of the Christian concept of God, several defi-
nitions of the Islamic concept of God, etc.). And, if we accept conceptual plurality 
also from the philosophical side, we would have a definition of the concept of God 
associated with classical theism, a definition of the concept of God associated with 
process theism, and so on and so forth. It would be a kind of pluralistic-definitional-
representational approach to the concept of God.
There are however two problems with (PG) that seem to undermine this or any 
other pluralistic version of a definitional-representational approach to God. I call 
them the problem of conceptual unity and the unicity of extension problem. Here 
is the first problem: how to guarantee that all these so-called concepts of God are 
in fact concepts of God? In other words, if these concepts are so different, in many 
cases even incompatible with each other, what sense is there in the claim that they 
are concepts-of-the-same-thing? What bonds them all as concepts of God?
Focusing on the pluralistic-definitional-representational approach to God sug-
gested above, the problem of conceptual unity would be something like this: in 
which sense can we say that our definitions, albeit definitions of different concepts, 
are definitions of concepts of God? One might say that what guarantees that these 
definitions are definitions of concepts of God is that there is a set of Godly distin-
guishing properties (albeit possibly very small) that is shared by all definitions. But 
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it is possible that two concepts of God do not share any properties at all. Suppose I 
have two concepts of God, named  God1 and  God2.  God1 is characterized as a wholly 
good being who has created the world, but who is neither omnipotent nor omnis-
cient (although extremely knowledgeable, he might not have perfect future knowl-
edge).  God2 is characterized as an omnipotent and omniscient being who is neither 
wholly good (although extremely good, he might have some few flaws of character) 
nor has created the world (the world might have always existed). Although  God1 and 
 God2 do not have any Godly distinguishing common properties, they both seem to 
be legitimate concepts of God.
The unicity of extension problem can be explained as follows. Concepts can 
be instantiated. Since we are admitting the existence of different concepts of God, 
it seems natural that all of them might be instantiated. But I have argued that the 
(monotheistic) concept of God is an extensionally unique concept: there can be at 
most one instance of it. Of course, we might say that each one of these concepts of 
God individually meets this criterion, that is to say, each one of them satisfies (AM). 
But then we have a situation where there might be an entity which is the instance of 
the Christian concept of God, a different entity which is the instance of the Jewish 
concept of God, a different one which is the instance of the Islamic concept of God, 
and so on and so forth. And how about if more than one of these possibilities is actu-
alized? We would have more than one GOD, which goes against (EAM).
To see the situation from the perspective of the pluralistic-definitional-represen-
tational approach does not make things better. To characterize a concept through 
a definition only makes sense if it is possible that there is an entity which satis-
fies all conditions, and therefore falls under the concept. Otherwise, the concept is 
an impossible concept. Supposing that our definitions of God do not characterize 
impossible concepts, it might be that two entities satisfy the conditions of two defi-
nitions, implying then the existence of two GODS.
To sum up: If we reject (PG), we make the definitional-representational approach 
to the concept of God susceptible to the problems of error and ignorance and lack of 
successful definitions. If we accept (PG), on one hand we get rid of these problems, 
but on the other we get stuck with the problem of conceptual unity and the unity of 
extension problem. It is important to stress that these two problems—the problem 
of conceptual unity and the unity of extension problem—are problems not only for 
a definitional approach to the concept of God, but for any pluralistic approach to the 
concept of God: they threaten the very tenability of the idea that there is a plurality 
of concepts of God, which is disturbing, for (PG) seems a very strong and reason-
able thesis.
My purpose in the rest of the article is to sketch a pluralistic hybrid R-theory of 
the concept of God that retains (PG) while solves the problem of conceptual unity 
and the unity of extension problem. It is hybrid because, in addition to definitions, 
it uses another structure in the characterization of X in (R): ideals. It is in a sense 
a version of the pluralistic-definitional-representational approach to God that I pro-
posed above that rejects both  (SAG) and (RUA G).
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6  The theory of ideal concepts
One of the most powerful criticisms against the classical view of concepts was made 
in the 1970’s by Eleanor Rosch (1975, 1978). Rosch’s criticisms also provided the 
basis for several early alternatives to the classical view under the rubric of prototype 
theory. According to prototype theorists, most concepts are complex representations 
whose structure encodes a statistical analysis of the properties their members tend to 
have—a list of properties that are found to greater or lesser degrees in the category, 
for example. From a representational viewpoint, a prototype can then be seen as a 
list of statistically significant properties.
Many readers, however, have interpreted Rosch’s early writings as suggesting that 
a concept is characterized by a single prototype or best exemplar of the category 
(Murphy, 2002, p. 41). According to this idea, the category of dogs is represented by 
a single dog that best embodies the attributes normally found in dogs. A prototype 
in this case would be this special exemplar of the category. From the point of view 
of (T) and (R), the basis of the structure kind X would then be a singular individual.
Something similar happens with another alternative to the classical view, first 
proposed by Medin & Schaffer (1978) in the late 1970s: exemplar theory. According 
to exemplar theory, the concept of dog is neither a definition nor a list of properties 
found to greater or lesser degrees in dogs, but (the psychological representation of) a 
specific set of exemplars of dogs, the dogs that had the strongest effect on someone’s 
memory, for example (Murphy, 2002, p. 49). Here also the basis of X is a singular 
individual.
Notice that in these two approaches—prototype theory and exemplar theory—
there is no longer a list of conditions whose satisfaction would be sufficient to clas-
sify something as an instance of a concept. How then, we might ask, do these theo-
ries work in relation to conceptual categorization? The keyword here is “similarity”. 
The fact that a single entity is similar enough to the prototype (or set of exemplars) 
entitles us to classify it as belonging to the category at hand. A particular object is 
classified as a chair if it is similar enough to the chair prototype (or chair exemplars, 
in the case of exemplar theory).
But not all similarity-based processing involves prototypes or sets of exemplars. 
Barsalou (1985) showed that many concepts are organized around similarity to ide-
als. An ideal is an exemplar that has the best characteristics of a category (Weiskopf, 
2009, pp. 152–153): the ideal diet, the ideal husband, the ideal trip, the ideal job, 
etc. While prototypes represent statistically significant properties, ideals involve 
superlatively desirable (or ideal) properties for a category. As a result, they are not 
statistically prominent; in many cases, they are properties that are relevant to what 
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we might call the purpose of the category (which is often culturally determined) 
(Lakoff, 1987, p. 76).
The view that an ideal is an exemplar of a category cannot be underestimated. 
It implies that the ideal diet, for example, is an exemplar of the diet category in the 
same way as a vegan diet and a diet for high-performance athletes are. An ideal is a 
particular instance of a concept, in the case the category can be conceptually repre-
sented, of course. Although the term “ideal” is used with other meanings, this is a 
meaning that is clearly found in the relevant literature.18
Although ideals are individual exemplars of a category, they are not ordinary 
exemplars. In general, ideals are not found in the concrete world (Weiskopf, 2009, 
p. 152). The ideal diet for example has probably zero calories, although no real 
diet has zero calories (the prototypical diet certainly has more than zero calories) 
(Weiskopf, 2009, p. 152). Most likely, no real, concrete husband has all the attrib-
utes, to the right degree, of the ideal husband: perfect provider, perfectly faithful, 
strong, respectful, attractive, sensitive, understandable, empathic, and so on.
This point is crucial. First, because it implies the existence of exemplars of cat-
egories that do not exist in the concrete world (the ideal diet, the ideal husband, the 
ideal job, etc.). Second because it suggests that, like sets, propositions, the number 
2 and Dante’s Inferno, ideals are abstract objects. Third because it indicates that the 
reason why ideals are not found in the concrete world is the same as why entities 
that fall under IMP abstract concepts cannot be concrete. Like IMP abstract con-
cepts, ideals embody a view too perfect or excellent of things we find in the world. 
Among all the members of the category of husbands, there is a special one—the 
ideal husband—that possesses the best characteristics of that category, which are 
those resulting from the process of perfecting the relevant properties of the actual 
exemplars of the category.
It is important to remark that the expression “ideal husband” is ambiguous. It 
might refer to an abstract object, the ideal member of the category of husbands, let 
us call it m, but also to a concept, the concept of ideal husband, and the correspond-
ing category.19 Needless to say, the concept of ideal husband is an IMP abstract con-
cept. The argument I gave in Sect. 2 to show that God is an IMP abstract concept 
can be rephrased to show that the concepts of ideal diet, ideal husband, ideal job, 
etc. are all IMP abstract.
What is not so obvious is that the category of ideal husbands is a possibly non-
empty category of nonabstract entities. In other words, some actual husbands might 
be ideal husbands. But when an exemplar of the category of husbands is also an 
18 George Lakoff, for example, writes as follows (1987, p. 76): “Many categories are understood in terms 
of abstract ideal cases—which may be neither typical nor stereotypical. […] Naomi Quinn (personal 
communication) has observed, based on extensive research on American conceptions of marriage, that 
there are many kinds of ideal models for a marriage: successful marriages, good marriages, strong mar-
riages, and so on. Successful marriages are those where the goals of the spouses are fulfilled. Good mar-
riages are those where both partners find the marriage beneficial. Strong marriages are those likely to 
last.” The emphasis is mine.
19 I am assuming that m itself is not an exemplar of the category of ideal husbands, although it is an 
exemplar of the category of husbands. The reason for that is that the concept of ideal husband already 




exemplar of the category of ideal husbands? When it is similar to m. In other words, 
the categorization process of IMP abstract concepts is to be based on similarity to 
ideals.
Building upon this suggestion, as well as upon the idea behind exemplar theory 
and the initial interpretation of prototype theory I mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, I propose what I call the theory of ideal concepts. The expression has 
a double meaning. It is a theory of ideal concepts in the sense that it aims to deal 
with ideal concepts, or IMP abstract concepts20; it is therefore a special theory of 
concepts, since it applies only to a specific kind of concept. But it is also a theory 
of ideal concepts in the sense that it aims to follow the aforementioned idea behind 
exemplar theory and the initial interpretation of prototype theory and take ideals, 
that is, specific exemplars of a category, as the basis of the X in (T) and (R). Seen as 
a T-theory, the theory of ideal concepts claims X to be these abstract objects we call 
ideals.
As mentioned, alike to prototype theory and exemplar theory, here categorization 
is also grounded on some similarity-based process. Suppose c is the ideal that char-
acterizes concept C. Whether an object x is an instance of C depends on how simi-
lar x is to c. But similarity between objects is assessed through the properties they 
possess. To find out whether x is similar to c we need a description of both x and c 
containing the properties they possess. The theory of ideal concepts therefore needs 
a list with the properties associated with the concept (in this case the abstract object 
c). See however that this does not bring us back to the classical view.
First because here the concept is not a definition, but an ideal. Second because 
the similarity-based process does not need to see the properties of c as necessary 
and sufficient conditions for category membership. Suppose that the concept of ideal 
husband is based on an ideal, abstract exemplar of husband—call it h—that is a per-
fect provider, perfectly faithful, strong, respectful, sensitive, understandable, etc. 
Whether a concrete husband x belongs to the category of ideal husbands depends on 
how much x is similar to h. But x may be similar to h even if it does not have some 
of the properties of h: it may be that x is not faithful in thoughts, for example. x can 
be similar to h even if it does not have any of h’s properties: x can be a great pro-
vider, but not a perfect provider; he can be very sensitive, but not perfectly sensitive, 
etc. In fact, since h is an ideal, the properties it possess, with their proper degrees, 
will never be instantiated in the concrete world.
Nevertheless, this list with the properties that c possesses is still a kind of defini-
tion (now applied to c itself, and not to the instances of C). And since the concept of 
C is to be characterized as the ideal c, this definition is something that a full account 
of C cannot avoid. Although from the viewpoint of a T-theory the concept is the 
ideal c, in terms of an intelligible representational structure, which is required by 
an R-theory, a definition is needed. Therefore, in the R-theory of ideal concepts the 
20 To minimize terminological confusion, I have so far preferred the expression “IMP abstract concept” 
over the expression “ideal concept”, even though they are synonymous (see Sect. 2, where the terms are 
first introduced). From now on I will relax this and allow myself to use freely the term “ideal concept”. 
The reader however should keep in mind that while “ideal concept” refers to the kind of concept I have 
so far referred to by the expression “abstract IMP concept”, the term “ideal” refers to a kind of abstract 
object, a special, idealized member of a category.
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X of (R) is best seen as a pair < c, Δc > , where c is an ideal and Δc is a list with the 
definitional properties of c. It is therefore a hybrid approach composed by two kinds 
of structures—definitions and ideals—that rejects (RUA). I call Δc the D-concept of 
C (D standing for definitional) and c the I-concept of C (I standing for ideal).
This R-theory of ideal concepts is therefore pluralistic in the sense that it rejects 
(UA) and (RUA). But it might also be pluralistic in the full sense of rejecting both 
(UA) and (SA). As any other object, the ideal c might be described in different, 
sometimes conflicting ways. There might be several Δc’s, with different lists of 
property conditions. C might then be represented as different pairs: < c, Δc > , < c, 
Δ’c > , < c, Δ”c > , and so on and so forth. While there is only one I-concept of C, 
that is, one ideal c, there might be several D-concepts of C.
7  An idealistic R‑theory of the concept of God
Let us now see how this full pluralistic R-theory of ideal concepts might be applied 
to the concept of God. First of all, besides meaning an ideal concept and the pos-
sible (unique) instance of this concept (that is to say, GOD), the word “God” also 
means an ideal, an abstract object. Let us call this abstract object g. In the same 
way that the ideal husband is an (abstract) exemplar of the category of husbands, 
g might be seen, for example, as the ideal exemplar of the category of beings: it 
has, in a maximally idealized way, desirable properties found in the members of 
this category, which guarantee g an ultimate value for believers.21 In this pluralistic 
R-theory of ideal concepts applied to God, which I call the idealistic R-theory of the 
concept of God, g plays the role of the I-concept of God. The list of properties which 
g supposedly possesses—Δg—plays the role of the D-concept of God. But as we 
have seen, different philosophers, traditions, and schools within traditions, disagree 
about which properties g possesses. Therefore, there is not only one Δg, but several 
D-concepts of God.
It is clear, then, that this idealistic R-theory of the concept of God rejects (RUA 
G). The X of  (RG) is a pair composed by two kinds of structures: an ideal g and a 
definition Δg. But how about  (SAG)? There are two perspectives that we can look 
from to answer this question. Looking from the perspective of the ideal g, the theory 
accepts  (SAG) and rejects (PG). There is only one ideal g; since the concept of God 
21 The question of what those desirable properties are is answered by specific D-concepts of God (see 
below). For example, while possessing intellect and will are in the list of properties of the concept of 
God linked to most monotheistic views, they are not in the list of the pantheistic concept of God (assum-
ing that pantheism can be included in the class of monotheistic views on GOD). A more fundamental 
issue comes from the following objection. Most exemplars of beings we know possess the properties 
of corporeality and complexity. These properties obviously conflict with incorporeality and simplicity, 
which are often attributed to GOD. Therefore, it seems false that God is an exemplar of the category of 
beings. In reply to this, I would say that the result of maximally perfecting a property P might be some-
thing quite different from P; it might even be something incompatible with P. Considering the perishable 
nature of material bodies, the result of maximally perfecting the property of corporeality might be its 




might be understood in terms of g, there is a unique concept of God. But looking 
from the perspective of Δg, the theory allows for a plurality of ways of defining g. g 
is one, but there might be different, conflicting attempts to characterize it in terms of 
the properties it supposedly possesses. Therefore, there might be different Δg’s and 
consequently different D-concepts of God. From this perspective, the theory is fully 
pluralistic: it rejects (RUA G) and  (SAG), consequently, accepting (PG).
Putting it in terms of D-concept and I-concept, while the following versions of 
(PG) and (SA) are true:
(PGD) There is a plurality of D-concepts of God.
(SAGI) There is such a thing as the unique I-concept of God.
the ones below are false:
(PGI) There is a plurality of I-concepts of God.
(SAGD)  There is such a thing as the unique D-concept of God.
The fact that these different Δg’s are attempts to characterize the same object—
the ideal g—guarantees that they are all concepts of the same thing, namely God. 
In other words, g bonds all Δg’s together as concepts of God. Thus, the problem of 
conceptual unity is solved. But since there is only one concept of God—recall that 
despite the name (D-concept), Δg is an attempt to characterize this ideal g, which 
from the perspective of an idealistic T-theory of the concept of God, is the actual 
concept of God—there will be at most one instance of the concept of God. Thus, the 
unicity of extension problem is solved.
See that a situation where two different non-abstract objects x’ and x” satisfy the 
conditions of Δ’g and Δ”g, respectively, does not threaten my solution to the unic-
ity of extension problem. The fact that the several Δg’s are attempts to characterize 
this one object g allows us to talk about the successful attempt to characterize the 
concept of God, or the proper, correct or best D-concept of God. If objects x’ and x” 
are different, then either Δ’g or Δ”g or none of them is the correct D-concept of God.
There are some important remarks to be made about this idealistic R-theory of 
the concept of God. The first one concerns the functioning of its similarity-based 
categorization process. It can be thought of in at least two different ways: in a strong 
way, according to which for a non-abstract object x to be similar to g it must have 
all g’s properties (with the exception of the property of abstractedness, of course), 
in the proper degree, or in a weaker way, according to which x might be similar 
to g even if it does not possess all g’s properties. While the first case produces an 
orthodox theistic view according to which g’s properties function as necessary and 
sufficient conditions for instantiation, the second results in a heterodox approach 
(albeit more traditional, from the perspective of prototype and exemplar theories) 
with some interesting consequences.
Suppose that g is omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good and has created the world. 
Suppose in addition that x is a non-abstract object who we know (through some very 
compelling argumentation, for example) has created the world. It seems reasonable 
to conclude from that that x has an astonishing amount of power and knowledge, and 
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perhaps some degree of benevolence. It thus makes sense to say that x is similar to 
g, similar enough for it to be taken as an (or the) instance of the concept of God. If 
we agree on this, we will have to concede that an argument that arrives at the con-
clusion that x exists is to be considered a successful argument for the existence of 
God, even though x does not possess all divine properties. Despite all the problems 
that design arguments have, at least one of the criticisms made against them, that the 
argument does not arrive at the God of religion (Hume, 1779), would lose much of 
its strength. This seem to be an interesting application of this approach. Of course, 
as in prototype theory and exemplar theory, the challenge is to provide a satisfactory 
characterization of similarity.
The second and third remarks concern some ontological issues related to the the-
ory of ideal concepts. As the ideal exemplar of a category (the category of beings), 
g exists. It exists in the same way that abstract objects such as sets, propositions and 
the number 2 do. On the other hand, we do not know whether GOD exists, that is, 
whether there is an instance of the concept of God. But if there is, it exists in a dif-
ferent way, as a non-abstract, causally efficacious object. Notice that this does not 
imply that GOD is concrete. As I am using the term, a concrete object is one that 
has spaciotemporal location; a non-abstract object is one that is causally efficacious. 
And as I have pointed out earlier, the latter does not entail the former: non-abstract 
non-concrete objects, that is, causally efficacious objects without spaciotemporal 
location are logically possible.
At this point one might object to the number of non-concrete entities postu-
lated by this theory of ideal concepts. Besides postulating the existence of a pla-
tonic realm containing the abstract objects I am calling ideals, it also postulates the 
existence of non-concrete causally efficacious objects which might be the instances 
of these abstract concepts. Although I believe that a tenable philosophical defense 
against such criticism can be built up, I will not try to do that here. The reason for 
that it that an R-theory of ideal concepts, which is my focus, is not threatened by 
such objection as much as a T-theory is.
As a representational theory, and this is the fourth remark, all this idealistic 
R-theory of the concept of God postulates is that concepts be represented as objects. 
This is not new. In his logical attempt to integrate Leibniz’s metaphysics of indi-
vidual concepts and logic of concepts, Edward Zalta (2000) represents concepts as 
abstract objects. Although Zalta does not claim to be following a mere represen-
tational approach—he seems to defend the claim that, for Leibniz, concepts are in 
fact abstract objects—, his logic of concepts (in the contemporary sense of the term 
“logic”) and, as matter of fact, any logic of concepts, is more than anything a theory 
of representation (as well as a theory of inference). Sketching how my R-theory of 
the concept of God would look like when expanded into a logical theory can thus 
help me to highlight its representational feature.
As in Zalta’s logic, the domain D of this logical R-theory of ideal concepts would 
have two kinds of objects: abstract objects on one hand, and non-abstract, causally 
efficacious objects on the other (in Zalta’s, instead of non-abstract objects we have 
concrete objects). Some of those abstract objects might be ideals, and some of these 
ideals might be I-concepts. From the point of view of the logical language, abstract 
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objects would be represented in the same way as any other object: through variables 
and constants. There would be a constant g meant to represent the ideal God. In 
order to allow for a plurality of Δg’s, a modal framework where constants denote the 
same object in all possible worlds (rigid designators), the objects of D exist in all 
possible worlds (constant domain) and the set of possible worlds W is not the same 
as the set of all logically possible worlds (K-semantics)—this is a semantic char-
acterization of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML)—would do the job. 
Each possible world would characterize g differently, corresponding to what might 
be termed a theistic world, that is, a complete way to conceive God. A specific Δg 
would correspond to a set of theistic worlds.
My fifth remark concerns polytheism. So far, I have dealt exclusively with the 
monotheistic concept of God. But how about a polytheistic view of God? Can my 
idealistic R-theory account for it? Yes, it can. But before explaining how, I must 
point out that not everything from my analysis can be applied to polytheism. The 
unicity of extension problem, for example, is obviously not a problem for poly-
theism: since there might be several instances of the concept of a god,22 it is not 
restrained by the monotheistic assumption. Also, the kind of plurality usually asso-
ciated with the term “polytheism” is different from the plurality I have dealt with 
here. The polytheistic view is plural because the corresponding versions of (AM) 
and (EAM).
(AM’) There is at most one entity that falls under the concept of a god.
(EAM’) There is at most one god; otherwise said, the number of extensions of 
the word “god” is at most one.
are false: it is extensionally plural. On the other hand, as the formulation of (PG) 
makes clear, the plurality I have been dealing with here is conceptual. There are, of 
course, different concepts of a god. The concept of a god in Nordic paganism is dif-
ferent from the concept of a god in ancient Greek religion, which is different from 
the concept of a god in polytheistic Hinduism. But it seems safe to say that we do 
not find here the same degree of controversy found on the monotheistic side. Rich-
ard Swinburne’s (1970, p. 6) definition of a god as a non-embodied rational agent of 
great power, for example, is probably compatible with most polytheistic traditions.
But independently on the way we characterize it, the concept of a god is also an 
idealization in the sense of a view too perfect or excellent of things we find in the 
world. Take Swinburne’s definition, for example. I have argued above (footnote 20) 
how incorporeality can be seen as the result of maximally perfecting the property of 
corporeality. Also, the power displayed by many gods (that allow them to oversee 
and exercise control over certain natural phenomena, for example) is a maximization 
of the power we observe in humans and other animals, usually going beyond what is 
physically possible.
22 When referring to polytheism, I will use the expressions “god” and “concept of a god”, instead of 
“God” and “concept of God”, which I keep reserving to the monotheistic view.
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Having said that, here is how the idealistic R-theory of the concept of God might 
deal with polytheism. In the same way that there is an abstract object that is an ideal 
exemplar of the category of beings—that is g, which is our I-concept of God—we 
might claim that there is an ideal exemplar of the category of rational beings, which 
will play the role of the I-concept of a god. Let us call it g’. Swinburne’s definition 
might then be seen as a D-concept of a god, that is to say, as an attempt to definition-
ally characterize g’. While g is bound by our monotheistic assumptions, g’ is not. 
Consequently, there might be several non-abstract objects that fall under the concept 
of a god. As before, a non-abstract object x is said to fall under the concept of a god 
if it is similar enough to g’.
The reason I wrote “an ideal exemplar” and not “the ideal exemplar”, as before, 
is that since g and g’ might be the best exemplars of the same category (in the case 
GOD is in fact a rational being), using the definite article “the” would give a sense 
of unicity incompatible with the situation. This is the only major change necessary 
for the theory to account for polytheism. Also notice that g and g’ are different from 
each other. Although related, the concept of God and the concept of a god are dif-
ferent concepts.23 There are at least four reasons for that. First, as ideals, g and g’ 
relate to different categories. Second, only g is required to be of ultimate value for 
believers.24 Third, the concept of God and the concept of a god differ with respect 
to a very important point: the satisfaction of the assumptions of monotheism. While 
(AM) and (EAM) are true, (AM’) and (EAM’) are false. But not only that. Appar-
ently, the following assumption (that I call assumption of polytheism) is true:
(AP) If there is any entity that falls under the concept of a god, then there is more 
than one entity that falls under the concept of a god.
My last remark concerns the debate on the rationality of theism. Its two main 
‘fronts’—the construction and analysis of arguments for and against the existence 
of GOD and the analysis of the concept of God—can be described in terms of the 
concept of God as well as in terms of criteria of rational acceptance. For the sake 
of simplicity, I explain this from a theistic perspective. A theistic argument is con-
cerned with the actuality of GOD, the supposed entity which falls under the concept 
of God; it therefore functions as a positive-ontological criterion of rational accept-
ance. On the other hand, one of the main concerns of the analysis of the concept of 
God is the question of whether God is a possible or coherent concept. To ration-
ally believe in GOD, the first thing one must do is to make sure that God is not 
23 Because of that, the following alternative account is not feasible: having only one ideal  to represent 
a generic concept of god, and the several monotheistic and polytheistic concepts being attempts (D-con-
cepts) to characterize it. According to the account I am proposing, the Nordic concept of a god and the 
concept of God of classical theism, for example, are not on the same level: while the former would take 
the shape of a D-concept meant to characterize the ideal g’, the later would correspond to a D-concept 
meant to characterize a different ideal, that is g.
24 I am assuming that, although believers in the polytheistic traditions attach great value to the gods, and 




an impossible concept. It therefore functions as a negative-conceptual criterion of 
rational acceptance.
But it seems that there is something between these two extremes, namely a posi-
tive-conceptual criterion of rational acceptance. A great deal of people would per-
haps reject, from mere conceptual reasons, the belief in the existence of a tribal, 
exclusivist and vengeful GOD who demands exclusive worship for himself, even if it 
corresponds to a coherent concept. On the other hand, viewing GOD as a forgiving 
and compassionate father who loves equally all human beings, for example, seems to 
play the opposite role in many people’s acceptance of theistic belief. From a general 
point of view, plausibility or likelihood is what lies between possibility and actual-
ity. It thus seems reasonable to take the plausibility of the concept of God as the core 
of this positive-conceptual criterion of rational acceptance.
One of the problems with this idea is that plausibility and likelihood are terms 
that we usually attach to propositions, not concepts. Furthermore, a reduction of 
plausible concepts from plausible propositions is not as trivial as a reduction of pos-
sible concepts from possible propositions.25 To go on with this idea, it seems that 
we need at the very minimum a theory of concepts that allows the discourse on the 
plausibility of concepts.
It turns out that the theory of ideal concepts allows that. Since it makes sense, in 
this theory, to talk about Δg as the proper, correct or best D-concept of God, it also 
makes sense to talk about Δg as a plausible D-concept of God; it also makes sense 
to say that Δg is more or less plausible than another D-concept of God. The other 
way to see this is to note that Δg might be represented as a proposition, namely one 
stating that g possesses properties  P1,  P2 … and  Pn, for all properties  Pi’s contained 
in Δg. As such, at least in principle we can talk about the plausibility or likelihood 
of Δg.
Of course, this is the very minimum, as I said. To have a theory of the plausibility 
of the concept of God we will need to argue for some general criteria of concep-
tual plausibility applicable to all concepts, as well as for specific criteria applicable 
only to the concept of God.26 Nevertheless, the fact that we can, within this ide-
alistic R-theory of the concept of God, speak about the plausibility of the concept 
of God, along with the other issues discussed—the problem of conceptual unity 
and the unity of extension problem, the similarity-based categorization process, the 
25 Let  PC be the proposition that there is an object which falls under concept C. C is a possible concept 
iff  PC is a possible proposition. On the other hand, the claim that  PC is a plausible proposition is one 
of the things that might appear as conclusion of an argument for the existence of GOD, in this case an 
inductive or evidential argument. It does not seem to concern with the concept of God itself.
26 With the help of these general criteria of conceptual plausibility we could compare, for example, the 
concept of God with the concept of a god. But what are these criteria? Keeping in mind that answer-
ing that question is definitely beyond the scope of this article, here are some ruminations that might be 
proved useful. First of all, for a concept to be plausible it must be coherent: possibility is a precondition 
of plausibility. Second, fruitfulness seems to be a desideratum of conceptual plausibility. A concept is 
fruitful if it has a high explanatory power. In its turn, a concept has a high explanatory power if it is an 
indispensable part of a very compelling explanation of phenomena for which there is no consensually 
accepted explanation. Third, it also seems desirable that a plausible concept be simple, or as simple as 
the other constraints allow. Finally, all that makes sense only if the concept is precise, in the sense of 
being described in clear terms.
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tenability of its being formalized within the SQML and my proposed polytheistic 
account—seem to point to the fruitfulness of the theory.
8  Conclusion
In this article I have analyzed some of the main criticisms against the classical the-
ory of concepts regarding its use in the characterization of the concept of God. One 
of the results of this analysis was that the problems that threaten a definitional-repre-
sentational approach to the concept of God—the problem of error and ignorance and 
the problem of lack of successful definition—depend on the plurality inherent to the 
religious context. This plurality depends on  (SAG), the thesis that there is a unique 
concept of God. Once we reject it and accept its negation—the thesis that there is a 
plurality of concepts of God (PG)—we get rid of these two problems; on the other 
hand, we get stuck with two new problems: the problem of conceptual unity and the 
unity of extension problem. These problems threaten the tenability of the very idea 
that there is a plurality of concepts of God as well as the prospects of any pluralistic 
approach to the concept of God.
In the second part of the paper, I outlined a hybrid special theory of concepts, 
called the theory of ideal concepts. The theory is special because it deals with a spe-
cial kind of concepts, called ideal concepts, to which the concept of God belongs. 
It is hybrid because, in addition to definitions, it uses another structure in the char-
acterization of X in (T) and (R): ideals. I then argued that when aimed at  (RG) and 
added to a pluralistic view of concepts, this theory answers the problem of concep-
tual unity and the unity of extension problem. I called this pluralistic theory of ideal 
concepts applied to the concept of God the idealistic R-theory of the concept of God.
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